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Abstract
The alignment of collective goals and individual behavior has been extensively studied by
economists under a principal-agent framework. Two main solutions have been presented:
explicit incentive contracts and monitoring. These solutions correspond to changes in the
objective situation faced by individuals. However, an extensive literature in social psychol-
ogy provides evidence that behavior is influenced, not only by situational constraints, but
also by attitudes. Therefore, an important aspect of organization is to choose the struc-
tures and procedures that best contribute to the dissemination of the desired attitudes
throughout the organization. This paper studies how the initial configuration of attitudes
and the size of the organization affect the optimal organizational structure and the timing
of information flows when the objective is to align the members’attitudes. We identify and
characterize three factors that affect the optimal organizational structures and procedures
and the degree of alignment of attitudes: (1) clustering effects; (2) member cross-influence
effects; and (3) leader cross-influence effects.
Keywords: Organizational Structure; Timing of Information Flows; Attitude Change;
Influence.
1 Introduction
A fundamental issue of organization is the definition of the structures and procedures
that deal effi ciently with the problem of motivation, i.e., that ensure that the different
members willingly make their contribution to the cooperative activity. The motivation
problem has been extensively studied in the economics literature under a principal-agent
framework (e.g., Ross, 1973; Holmström, 1982; Holmström and Milgrom, 1994). The
problem of aligning individual behavior and collective goals is not a trivial one, due to
moral hazard. Moral hazard arises when actions which have effi ciency implications are not
easily observable and individuals may act in their own interest, not paying the due attention
to the collective goals of the organization. Two main solutions to the motivation problem
have been advanced by agency theorists. The first is an increase in the resources spent
on monitoring and verification. The second consists of using explicit incentive contracts.
Even if actions are not observable, contracts may be designed which are contingent upon
observed outcomes, rewarding success and creating incentives for good behavior.
These two solutions have something in common. They correspond to changes in the
objective situation faced by individuals and build on the idea that extrinsic incentives in-
fluence individual behavior. As explicitly recognized by several economists (e.g., Radner,
1992; Bernheim, 1994; Kreps, 1997; Gibbons, 1998), behavior in organizations is deter-
mined, not only by economic incentives, but also by socio-psychological factors that affect
individual preferences. These socio-psychological factors are terra incognita for standard
microeconomics. In contrast, the concept of attitude has played a central role in the at-
tempts of social psychologists to understand human behavior (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen,
1974; Ajzen, 1988; Pratkanis and Turner, 1994; Kraus, 1995). Attitudes are summary
evaluations of persons, objects, ideas, or activities along a dimension ranging from positive
to negative. As Fishbein and Ajzen point out, “there is general agreement that a person’s
attitude towards some object constitutes a predisposition on his part to respond to the
object in a consistently favorable or unfavorable manner” (1974, p. 59).1 To the extent
1There is an extensive literature in the field of social psychology on the relationship between individual
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that attitudes influence behavior, the objective of attaining collective goals translates into
a problem of disseminating the attitudes that contribute to the attainment of those goals.
Individual attitudes are related in a systematic way to a number of things, including
beliefs, values, personality and past behavior. However, members’attitudes are also af-
fected by the attitudes of the organization members with whom they interact (e.g., Weiss
and Nowicki, 1981; Griffi n, 1983). Thus, an important managerial issue is to choose the
organizational structure and procedures that best contribute to the dissemination of the
desired attitudes throughout the organization. In this paper, we assume that the top man-
ager’s objective is to align members’attitudes with his/her own. Clearly, there are real life
situations where diversity of attitudes may be beneficial (e.g., March, 1996). Some degree
of heterogeneity among individuals may facilitate creativity and innovation, improving the
adaptive capacity of the organization. In this paper, we focus on those situations where
conformity is beneficial and, as a result, the objective of the top manager is to align the
members’attitudes with his/her own. For example, the top manager may be willing to
disseminate a positive attitude towards customer-orientation, hard-working or social re-
sponsibility. Notice, however, that the general framework proposed in this paper can also
be used to analyze the conditions under which diversity is produced. In fact, our model can
be used to analyze the conditions under which the organization converges to any desired
configuration of attitudes, given the initial conditions and the dynamic process of attitude
change.
We do not model the impact of attitudes on behavior explicitly. Instead, we borrow from
social psychology the idea that, at least under certain circumstances, attitudes influence
behavior and study the impact of organization on the dynamic process of attitude change.
attitudes and behavior (e.g., Fishbein and Ajzen, 1974; Fazio, 1986; Ajzen and Sexton, 1999). Although
some early studies, in particular the one conducted by LaPiere (1934), indicated that attitudes were
largely irrelevant to the prediction of behavior, recent empirical research confirms that, in general, attitudes
influence behavior (see, for an overview, Kraus, 1995). However, the consistency of attitudes and behaviors
has been found to depend on a number of factors, such as the level of effort required to perform a
behavior (e.g., Bagozzi, Yi and Baumgartner, 1990), the accessability of the attitude from memory (e.g.,
Fazio, Powell and Williams, 1989), the extent to which individual behavior is susceptible to situational or
interpersonal cues, as opposed to inner states or dispositions (e.g., Ajzen, Timko and White, 1982), and
the consistency between the affective and cognitive components of an attitude (e.g., Norman, 1975).
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More specifically, we take the perspective of a top manager whose objective is to choose
the organizational structure and the timing of information flows that best contribute to
align members’attitudes with his/her own.
We refer to organizational structure as the system of formal and informal communi-
cation channels that characterize an organization. Behind this notion is the recognition
that important networks of informal communication often complement or bypass the sys-
tems of formal authority and the regulated channels. We identify two extreme types of
organizational structures: the hierarchy and the network. Hierarchies and networks have
been characterized in many ways in the literature (e.g., Hummon and Fararo, 1995; Carley
and Lin, 1997). In this paper, we use the words “hierarchy” and “network” in a very
specific sense. We think of a hierarchy as a system in which the communication channels
correspond to the links of authority that characterize the formal structure. The formal
structure is composed of the set of positions in the organization, the way these positions
are clustered, and the way the formal authority flows among them (e.g., Mintzberg, 1983).
We define the network as an organizational structure where the communication channels
corresponding to the formal links of authority are complemented by a complex system of
informal relationships between organization members, so that all the members within the
organization are linked. We also consider all the intermediate situations between these two
extreme cases. A hybrid organization is any intermediate structure, where some informal
relationships exist and others do not.
As pointed out by Friedkin (1993), the two components of social influence are inter-
personal visibility and salience. Individual i’s influence on individual j depends on j’s
knowledge of i’s attitude. Invisible attitudes cannot be directly influential. In line with
Friedkin (1993, p. 863), we assume that j knows i’s attitude if i and j communicate with
each other. Once j is aware of i’s attitude, then i’s influence on j depends on the salience
or value of i’s attitude for j. Irrelevant attitudes cannot directly influence j. Thus, by de-
termining who communicates with whom, organizational structure may affect the process
of attitude change within the organization. For example, in a network the top manager is
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able to exercise direct influence on subordinates in different levels of the organization; and
the members’attitudes may reinforce each other. In contrast, in a hierarchy, the top man-
ager contacts only his/her direct subordinates; and the possibility of mutual reinforcement
of attitudes is lessened. These two scenarios are likely to have very different implications
for top managers trying to change attitudes. However, it is not clear which of these two
extreme structures better facilitates change.2
The dynamic process of attitude change is modeled as follows. The attitude of each
individual towards a given issue is assumed to be in one of two possible states: a “positive”
attitude or a “negative”attitude. This assumption is justified by our focus on the align-
ment of attitudes. In fact, two attitudes are said to be aligned if they have the same sign,
no matter their absolute values. This explains our binary characterization of attitudes.
Consider an initial configuration of attitudes and a given set of interactions among orga-
nizational members. These interactions are fixed and not supposed to change over time.
The attitude of each individual is affected by two different things: his/her personal values
and the influence exercised by others over him/her. These two influences may reinforce
each other, if aligned, or have the opposite effect. In the latter case, the stronger influence
prevails. The system may or may not be in a stable situation. We say that the system
is in a stable situation when the attitude of each individual is aligned with the combined
impact of his/her personal values and the influence exercised by others over him/her. A
model that describes how the system may evolve to a more stable configuration is the one
developed in the seminal paper by Hopfield (1982) regarding the so-called neural network.
In this paper, we use the simplest version of the neural network model to describe the
dynamic process of attitude change.
2We assume that all the influences are positive, meaning that all communications produce results
consistent with the source attitudes. This means that when two individuals with the same attitude interact,
their attitudes are reinforced. However, people have attitudes not only toward objects or ideas, but also
relative to the people with whom they are communicating. According to Balance Theory (Heider,1946),
at the extreme one may dislike something because a person he/she dislikes is advocating for it. Thus,
influences may be negative. This issue is briefly discussed in the conclusion.
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The structure of the organization, as described above, defines who communicates with
whom and, therefore, who influences whom. However, the evolution of attitudes within
the organization also depends on the timing of information flows. By influencing who gets
the new information first, top management may affect the order in which individuals revise
their attitudes. As a consequence, attitudes do not necessarily change all at the same time.
Thus, we consider two classes of dynamics of attitude change: the simultaneous dynamics
and the sequential dynamics. In the simultaneous dynamics information flows quickly
in the organization, so that all the members adjust their attitudes simultaneously. This
scenario may be understood as corresponding to the situation where issues are discussed
openly, with a high level of participation, so that attitudes change almost simultaneously.
In the sequential dynamics, individuals adjust their attitudes sequentially, from the top of
the organization to the bottom. This scenario may represent the situation where issues
are discussed within subgroups, starting at the top of the organization.3
The evolution of attitudes in an organization depends not only on its structure and
on the timing of information flows, but also on the initial configuration of attitudes. Two
different types of initial configurations appear to be particularly interesting: the supported
leader case and the non-supported leader case. The supported leader case corresponds
to the situation where at least half of the members in each organizational level have a
positive attitude. The non-supported leader corresponds to the situation where, in each
organizational level, the number of individuals with a positive attitude is less than the
number of individuals with a negative attitude. In the discussion of the non-supported
leader case, we pay special attention to the case of an isolated leader, which corresponds
to the situation where a leader tries to change the attitude of the rest of the organization,
which is opposed to his/her own.4 This captures important elements of the situation often
3Most likely, no real organization is correctly described by either of these two extreme specifications. In
general, we would expect a combination of both dynamics, with some subgroups changing their attitudes
simultaneously and others sequentially. However, since all the other possible dynamics are combinations
of the two extreme cases, we believe that the discussion of these two cases captures the main features of
the dynamics of attitude change in organizations.
4Note that the isolated leader case does not correspond to a situation where the top manager is not
influenced by its subordinates, but rather to the case where he/she has initially a different attitude from
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faced by top managers when initiating a change process in their organizations.5
In all these cases, the problem faced by the top manager is to choose the organizational
structure and the timing of information flows that favor the alignment of individuals’at-
titudes with his/her own. This paper studies this problem in the context of organizations
with an arbitrarily large number of hierarchical levels and an arbitrarily large number of in-
dividuals per level. By doing so, we overcome the limitations, pointed out by Watts (1999),
associated with models with a relatively small number of members. The consideration of
arbitrarily large organizations is important to ensure an accurate understanding of the
forces underlying the dynamic process of influence and attitude change in organizations.
We identify three factors that determine the optimal organizational structure and the
extent to which the alignment of attitudes is achieved: (1) clustering effects, i.e., the
existence, in the formal structure, of clusters of individuals with a given attitude that only
communicate with members with the same attitude; (2) member cross-influence effects,
that result from direct peer contact and from all the direct diagonal relationships and
override of authority chain contacts excluding the top manager; and (3) leader cross-
influence effects, that result from all the direct diagonal relationships and override of
authority chain contacts including the top manager. For each initial configuration of
attitudes, the interplay of these factors determines the optimal organizational structure.
We show that in the supported leader case, the network is an optimal structure where
consensus is attained. In contrast, in the non-supported leader case, we identify conditions
under which the hierarchy dominates the network. In the specific case of an isolated leader,
we specify circumstances under which the hierarchy is optimal, leading to the desired
the rest of the organization. Independently of the initial configuration of attitudes, we consider throughout
the paper both top-down and bottom-up influences.
5As mentioned by Kotter and Heskett (1992), effort toward major change is often initiated by leaders
who “either came into their positions from outside their firms, came to their firms after an early career
somewhere else, ‘grew up’ outside the core of their companies or were unconventional in some other
way” (1992, page 89). As a result, these leaders tend to bring with them perspectives, personal values
and attitudes that are different from the ones that are dominant within their organizations. Kotter and
Heskett (1992) offer an interesting description and analysis of major change processes that occured in
several large organizations. Other important references on the topic of organizational change are Kanter,
Stein and Jick (1992) and Jick (1993).
6
consensus. When analyzing the relationship between the timing of information flows and
attitude change in organizations, we identify two types of situations where the choice of
dynamics is irrelevant. First, this may happen because, for the initial configuration of
attitudes and organizational structure considered, the system converges to the desired
equilibrium, independently of the dynamics. The dynamics may also be irrelevant because
the two dynamics lead to the same final equilibrium where the leader is isolated. In
addition, we specify conditions under which the choice of dynamics makes a difference. In
particular, we show that the sequential dynamics may dominate, or be dominated, by the
simultaneous dynamics.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 positions our contribution in the context
of the existing literature. Section 3 describes the model used to analyze the impact of or-
ganizational structure and the timing of information flows on attitudes. Section 4 presents
and discusses the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our paper is closely related to the research on networks of interpersonal interaction. Sub-
sequent to the important work by Lewin (e.g., 1951), several psychologists studied social
influence in groups (e.g., Festinger, Schachter and Back, 1950; Newcomb, 1961; Cartwright
and Zander, 1968). However, as pointed out by Eagly and Chaiken (1993, p. 660), research
by psychologists has been predominantly focusing on the psychological processes that me-
diate influence. In contrast, there is an extensive literature, developed by sociologists, on
social networks (e.g., Marsden, 1981; Friedkin, 1993; see Stokman, 2001, for an overview).
Recognizing that much of the real work in organizations happens despite the formal organi-
zation, this literature pays attention to the networks of relationships that individuals form
while interacting. In particular, our paper is closely related to the network theory of social
influence developed by Friedkin and Johnsen (e.g., Friedkin, 1986, 1991, 1998; Friedkin and
Johnsen, 1990, 1997), which builds on the early work of French (1956) and Harary (1959).
These authors propose a mathematical model of social influence, where interpersonal influ-
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ences occur when individuals take into account the opinions of others in the formation of
their own opinions on an issue. Individual opinions result from this endogenous process of
opinion formation and a number of exogenous factors. This model describes how a network
of interpersonal influences enters into a process of opinion formation, and how this opinion
formation process results in either a stable pattern of disagreement or group consensus.
Our model differs from the one developed by Friedkin and Johnsen in several impor-
tant dimensions. First, we explicitly assume that the top manager has some degree of
choice over the pattern of interactions and the order by which individuals influence each
other. In this context, we analyze how the top manager is able to affect the evolution
of attitudes by influencing organizational structure and the timing of information flows.
Assuming that the top manager’s objective is to align members’attitudes with his/her
own, we discuss how the optimal choices depend on the initial configuration of attitudes.
To accomplish this, we propose a model that allows for arbitrary initial configurations of
attitudes, which are treated as independent of other exogenous variables. In contrast to
our work, in the models mentioned above the initial configuration of attitudes is uniquely
determined by a set of exogenous variables. Second, while in the existing models the rule
governing the change of opinions is typically linear, in ours the rule is highly nonlinear.
This results from our emphasis on the alignment of attitudes. We say that two attitudes
are aligned with each other if and only if they have the same sign. To focus on the sign
of attitudes, we use a binary model, i.e., a model where attitudes may be either positive
or negative. This naturally implies a highly nonlinear dynamics. Third, while in Friedkin
and Johnsen’s model individuals revise their positions by taking weighted averages of the
influential positions of other members, meaning that the weights sum up to one, we do
not have to impose this restriction to ensure the convergence of the change process.6 Fi-
nally, our analysis differs from the one proposed by these authors by explicitly considering
different dynamics. In spite of acknowledging the possibility that influences are exercised
6In Friedkin and Johnsen’s model, the assumption that individuals revise their positions by taking
weighted averages of the influential positions of other members allows for the convergence of the process
of opinion change.
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sequentially (e.g., Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990, p. 195, footnote 3), Friedkin and Johnsen
focus on the simultaneous dynamics.
The analysis presented in this paper is also related to the extensive literature that uses
computational contagion models to analyze the dissemination of relevant determinants of
decisions in arbitrarily large networks. For example, Harrison and Carroll (1991, 2002)
propose a model of cultural transmission in organizations, Carley (1991) and Hirshman et
al. (2011) use a multi-agent dynamic-network simulation model to analyze group stability
and tiering effects in networks, Carroll and Burton (2001) discuss the optimal amount of
coordination needed to deal with organizational complexity, Valente (2005) models the
process of information diffusion, and Mungovan et al. (2011) study norm evolution in
social networks. A fundamental difference between our paper and this literature is that
we explicitly consider the formal links of authority that characterize an organization. This
allows us to study how organizational structure - defined by the set of the formal and infor-
mal communication channels - and the timing of information flows affect the dynamics of
the system. This is the distinctive contribution of our paper.7 In our model, individuals do
not have equally strong ties to all other individuals. In contrast, the influence exercised by
one organizational member on another one depends on their relative hierarchical position.
Although some of the papers mentioned above (e.g., Harrison and Carroll, 2002; Hirshman
et al., 2011) allow individuals to influence each other differently, such differences are based,
not on their relative hierarchical position, but on homophily - the principle that like seeks
like. The consideration of different organizational structures also allows us to derive our
conclusions in a mathematically closed-form way, without having to rely on simulation
methods, thus avoiding the validity issues often raised about the use of computational
models in organization science (Burton and Obel, 1995).
There have been other attempts to model the firm’s internal organization as a commu-
7Burton and Obel (1988) also contrast different organizational forms. There are, however, two main
differences to our paper. First, they focus on a different issue - the effect of opportunistic behavior on the
appropriate choice of economic organization. Second, they use a laboratory experiment and, consequently,
the interpretation of their results has to recognize the particular laboratory setup.
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nication network. For instance, one of the most influential approaches to the problem of
organizational design developed by economists, the theory of teams (e.g., Marschak and
Radner, 1972; and Radner, 1992), studies the effi cient use of information in an information-
ally decentralized organization. This theory focuses on the incomplete and heterogeneous
dissemination of information among the several decision makers, on the characterization of
decision functions that are optimal given that decentralization and, finally, on the compar-
ison of alternative (decentralized) information structures under the assumption that each
one will be used effi ciently. A related perspective on the problem of organizational design
is proposed by Sah and Stiglitz (1985 and 1986). These authors look at certain aspects
of an organization which they refer to as architecture. The architecture “describes how
the constituent decision-making units are arranged together in a system, how the decision-
making authority and ability is distributed within a system, who gathers what information,
and who communicates what with whom”(1986, page 716). Sah and Stiglitz compare dif-
ferent architectures according to the quality of decision making and conclude that the
architecture affects the errors made by individuals within the system, as well as how these
errors are aggregated. While these approaches to the problem of organizational design
view linkages among individuals as channels through which information flows and focus
on the effi cient use of information or on the quality of decision making, we conceive such
linkages as channels through which individuals influence each others’attitudes. Therefore,
this paper provides a complementary criterion to compare different organizational forms.
3 The Model
Consider an organization composed of N individuals.8 The attitude of each individual may
be described by one of two possible states, a “positive”or a “negative”attitude, depending
on how the agent feels about a certain issue. The state of this organization of N individuals
8A similar model has been used by Almeida Costa and Amaro de Matos (2002), focusing on very
small organizations with a limited number of hierarchical levels and individuals. In the present paper, by
focusing on arbitrarly large organizations we are able to provide a more complete characterization of the
forces underlying the dynamic process of attitude change.
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at a given time t is described by the vector of attitudes (s1(t), s2(t), . . . , sN(t)), where each
si = ±1, i = 1, 2, · · · , N represents the attitude of an individual.9
Without loss of generality, we assume that the top manager’s initial attitude is positive,
i.e., s1 = +1. The initial set of attitudes is not necessarily stable: attitudes evolve over time
as individuals are influenced by other members. The dynamics through which attitudes
in organizations evolve depends on the pattern of interactions among individuals. The
interaction between pairs of individuals is described by a N × N matrix J , where each
element Jij describes the influence of individual i over individual j. A positive value of
Jij means that a given attitude of i tends to influence j’s attitude in the same direction.
Conversely, a negative value of Jij means that a given attitude of i tends to influence j’s
attitude in the opposite direction. The intensity of the influence of i over j is given by
the absolute value of Jij. We assume that influences are reciprocal, in the sense that if
individual i influences individual j, then j also influences i.10 In other words, Jij = 0 ⇔
Jji = 0.
11
Consider a sequence of points in time, t = 1, 2, 3, . . . For a given set of attitudes at
time t, the j-th attitude is updated at time t + 1 based on three factors: the attitudes
of the other members at time t, the influence of each of them on j, and the strength of
j’s personal beliefs, values and personality. This last factor is represented by a variable
αj. The sign of this variable gives the attitude of j in the absence of influence by any of
the other members. Its magnitude allows us to compare the impact of j’s personal beliefs,
9Alternatively, attitudes could be modeled as continuous variables, rather than binary ones. Although
such a representation of attitudes may seem more natural, it would significantly complicate the analysis.
With continuous attitudes, there would be an infinite number of configurations of attitudes to be compared.
As mentioned in the Introduction, our binary approach is justified by our focus on the alignment of
attitudes.
10Note that this assumption does not imply that the influence of i over j has the same intensity as the
influence of j over i.
11There is an extensive literature in social psychology that analyzes influence in dyadic relationships
between an influencing agent and a target (see, for an overview, Eagly and Chaiken, 1993, ch. 13, pp.
634-642). This research largely focuses on the identification of the factors that determine the power the
influencing agent has to influence the target (e.g., French, 1956; Raven, 1965; Kelman, 1958, 1974; Cialdini,
1988). In other words, this literature discusses the factors that determine the value of a given Jij . Our
focus in this paper is different. We take each Jij as given, and discuss the conditions under which the
dynamic system of social influence in organizations evolves to a consensus.
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values and personality with the strength of the influence of the others over him/her. The
change of j-th attitude is assumed to occur according to the rule
sj(t+ 1) = sign
(∑
i
Jijsi(t) + αj
)
. (1)
Notice that sj tends to align with the personal values αj and with the attitudes of those
who have a positive influence over j (Jij > 0). In addition, it tends to align negatively (or
disalign) with the attitudes of those who have a negative influence over j (Jij < 0).
The rule in equation (1) defines how the attitude of a given member changes. It de-
scribes how the attitude of an individual at time t+ 1 is influenced by the attitudes of the
other individuals at time t. We still have to specify whether the above equation applies
to all individuals at the same time, or whether they update their attitudes sequentially.
We consider both the simultaneous and the sequential dynamics. Under the simultane-
ous dynamics, everybody revises his/her attitude simultaneously. Under the sequential
dynamics, attitudes are revised sequentially, according to a pre-specified order.
A set of attitudes is said to be in equilibrium when the configuration attains a fixed
point under the specified dynamics. The relevant issue in this model is to characterize the
equilibrium configuration under different conditions.
In our model, the top manager is seen as a change agent that tries to disseminate his/her
attitude through the organization. In this context, it makes sense to assume that the top
manager’s personal values and beliefs, given by α1, are so strong that his/her attitude does
not change when he/she is subject to the influence of the rest of the organization.
Under the assumption that the top manager’s objective is to align members’attitudes
with his/her own, we say that the optimal organizational structure is the one that max-
imizes the number of individuals that share the top manager’s attitude, assumed to be
positive. Clearly, the ideal organizational structures are those where the entire organiza-
tion converts to a positive attitude. And the worst possible structures are those leading to
an equilibrium where all individuals reach a negative attitude. When the system reaches
an equilibrium where some individuals have a positive attitude and others have a negative
12
attitude, the larger the number of individuals with a positive attitude, the better.12
The evolution of attitudes depends on the matrix of interactions, the nature of the
dynamics, and the initial configuration of attitudes. We now specify each element of the
model used to analyze attitude change in organizations.
3.1 Organizational Structures
We consider an organization with the following formal structure. Let l = 1, 2, ..., K label
the different levels of authority. In each level l there are, say, nl elements ordered as
i = 1, 2, ..., nl. Let n1 = 1. Each individual is formally subordinated by an authority link
to one individual in the next upper level l − 1, except, of course, when l = 1. Also, the
i-th individual of level l is the direct superior of qil individuals in the next lower level l+ 1,
except, obviously, when l = K. Thus, nl+1 =
∑nl
i=1 qil for all l ≥ 1.
The formal structure does not incorporate the informal relationships that often com-
plement the regulated system of authority. Therefore, it may or may not correspond to
the structure of communication channels within the organization. The two extreme or-
ganizational structures, the hierarchy and the network, are characterized as follows. In
the hierarchy, the communication channels correspond to the formal links of authority. In
particular, we define the matrix of influences Jh, where Jhij represents the intensity of the
influence of individual i over individual j, as follows
Jhij =

u if i is a direct superior of j
d if i is a direct subordinate of j
0 otherwise
As mentioned above, individual i’s ability to influence individual j depends, not only
on his/her interpersonal visibility, but also on the salience or value of i’s attitude for j
(e.g., Friedkin, 1993). Irrelevant attitudes cannot directly influence j. We consider that
12When comparing the different organizational structures and the different dynamics, we just look at
the final configuration, ignoring the length of the adjustment period. The sequential dynamics typically
requires a larger number of interactions than the simultaneous dynamics. However, this does not imply
that the length of the adjustment period in the sequential dynamics is larger. The reason is that one
step of the simultaneous dynamics may take longer than one step of the sequential dynamics. In fact, in
real life situations discussions involving many people at the same time may take longer than a number of
discussions in small groups.
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the salience of i’s attitude for j depends on their relative hierarchical position. More
specifically, we assume that each element influences his or her subordinates equally, with
intensity u > 0. For instance, the influence of the top manager on individuals in level 2 is
expressed by Jh1j = u, for j = 1, . . . , q11. It is also assumed that subordinates influence their
direct superiors equally, with intensity d > 0 and d < u. For example, the top manager
is influenced by the individuals in level 2, but with less intensity. This is expressed by
Jhi1 = d, with u > d > 0 for i = 1, . . . , q11.
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In the network, the communication channels corresponding to the formal links of au-
thority are complemented by a system of informal relationships. In these informal channels,
individuals bypass the formal authority system in order to communicate directly. The net-
work structure is characterized by the existence of channels of communication between
every pair of elements, independently of the hierarchical role of these elements within the
organization. This corresponds to assume three types of informal relationships: direct
peer contact - individuals in the same level communicate directly rather than through
their superiors; direct diagonal contact - an individual at one level of the formal structure
communicates directly with the subordinates of a peer; and override of authority chain -
managers are bypassed as their superior communicates directly with their subordinates.
In particular, we define the matrix of influences Jn, where Jnij represents the intensity of
the influence of individual i over individual j, as
Jnij =

u if i is a superior of j
d if i is a subordinate of j
e if i is at the same level as j
0 otherwise
Again, we assume that each element influences all the elements in lower levels equally,
with intensity u > 0. This is expressed by Jn1j = u for all j. It is also assumed that every
element influences all individuals in upper levels equally, with intensity d > 0 and d < u.
13The assumption that u > d can also be justified by the fact that managers control several factors that
may affect values, beliefs and attitudes of their subordinates (Harrison and Carroll, 1991). In the same
vein, the influence exercised by superiors over subordinates encompasses not only an element of conformity,
whereby an agent simply follows the behavior of another agent, but also an element of obedience, which
results from enforcement by an authority (Elsenbroich and Xenitidou, 2012).
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Finally, since all relationships are considered, we include the influence among individuals
within the same hierarchical level. Whatever the considered level, their reciprocal influence
is assumed to be given by e > 0 with e < u.
A hybrid structure is any intermediate case, where some informal relationships exist
and others do not. In a hybrid structure the communication channels corresponding to
the formal links of authority are complemented by an incomplete network of informal
communications. Any hybrid structure is characterized by an influence matrix J as follows.
If Jij is different from zero in the hierarchy, then it has the same value in any hybrid
structure. At least one of the other off-diagonal elements of the J matrix of the hybrid
organization is positive, and at least one is zero. Furthermore, all non-zero elements of
this matrix have the same value as in matrix Jn.14
3.2 Simultaneous and Sequential Dynamics
In this section, we describe the implementation of the different dynamics. We assume
that personal values and beliefs are relatively weak, so that influences play a relevant role.
Obviously, if personal values and beliefs are relatively strong, individual attitudes do not
change. More specifically, we assume that αj = 0 for all j > 1. As already mentioned, we
also assume that α1 is suffi ciently large for the top manager’s attitude not to change.
3.2.1 Simultaneous Dynamics
From equation (1), the total influence over element j at time t is given by
hj(t) =
N∑
i=1
Jijsi(t).
If hi(t) is positive, the j-th element will have a positive attitude at time t+ 1; if hj(t)
is negative,the j-th element will have a negative attitude at time t+ 1.
In the simultaneous dynamics all individuals revise their attitudes at the same time.
Hence, at time t + 1, sj(t + 1) = sign hj(t). The equilibrium configuration of attitudes at
14These specifications can be generalized in several different ways. For example, some parameters could
be negative, and different u’s, d’s and e’s could have different values. The number of alternative scenarios
is unbounded. For simplicity, we limit our analysis to the above mentioned cases.
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time t is given by sj(t)hj(t) > 0, for all j.
3.2.2 Sequential Dynamics
In the sequential dynamics, attitudes are revised starting from the top of the formal struc-
ture to the bottom, in repeated cycles until an equilibrium is reached. We assume that, in
each cycle, the sequence of attitude change in each level follows the numbering given to the
individuals in that level. Let j = t+ 1−N
[
t
N
]
, where [a] denotes the integer part of the
real number a. For an initial configuration {s1(0), s2(0), . . . , sN(0)}, this dynamics implies
that the configuration of attitudes at any future time t is given by sj(t) =sign hj(t−1) and
si(t) = si(t−1),∀i 6= j. Equilibrium is reached at the first time t such that si(t)hi(t) > 0, for
all i. At this point in time, the attained configuration becomes invariant, by construction.
3.3 Initial Configurations of Attitudes
A leader who is interested in changing the configuration of attitudes prevailing in the
organization may face very different situations. Two initial situations are considered:
the supported leader case and the non-supported leader case. The supported leader case
corresponds to the situation where at least half of the members in each organizational level
have a positive attitude. The non-supported leader corresponds to the situation where, in
each organizational level, the number of individuals with a positive attitude is less than
the number of individuals with a negative attitude. In the discussion of the non-supported
leader case, we pay special attention to the particular case of an isolated leader. In the
isolated leader case si = −1 for i 6= 1 at time zero.
4 Results
We now characterize the equilibrium configuration of attitudes under different scenarios.
4.1 Supported Leader
Consider first the supported leader case. In the hierarchy, for any dynamics the ability
of the top manager to disseminate his/her attitude depends on the influence exercised by
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superiors over subordinates. In contrast, in the network the attitude of the top manager
prevails independently of the dynamics and of the influence exercised by superiors over sub-
ordinates. Hence, the network is an optimal organizational structure, (weakly) dominating
not only the hierarchy, but also all hybrid structures.
Proposition 4.1 In the supported leader case, the network is an optimal structure and
leads, under both dynamics, to an equilibrium where all individuals have the same attitude
as the top manager.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the supported leader case, the informal relationships that characterize the network
help the top manager in imposing his/her initial attitude. In the hierarchy, there are typi-
cally clusters of individuals with a negative attitude that do not interact with individuals
having the opposite attitude. This clustering effect makes attitude change more diffi cult.
In the network and in hybrid organizations, there is another effect, the cross-influence
effect, that may help overcome this problem. This effect results from the informal rela-
tionships that characterize these organizational structures. In the network, since at least
half of the members in each level have a positive attitude, the cross-influence effect leads
to the diffusion of the top-manger’s attitude.
It follows from this proposition that, under the optimal organizational structure, the
network, the ability of the top manager to impose his/her initial attitude does not depend
upon the dynamics under consideration.
Corollary 4.1 In the supported leader case, under the network the dynamics is irrelevant.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The key difference between the sequential dynamics and the simultaneous dynamics
is that in the former individuals in upper levels revise their attitudes before exercising
their influence over individuals in lower levels. In the supported leader case, under a
network the order by which individuals in different levels revise their attitudes is irrelevant.
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Independently of the dynamics, the field felt by each individual is positive because, in each
level, the number of individuals with a positive attitude is greater or equal than the number
of individuals with a negative attitude and everybody communicates with everybody.
It also follows from Proposition 4.1 that, under the network, the ability of the leader
to impose his/her attitude does not depend on the value of u.
Corollary 4.2 In the supported leader case, under the network the strength of the influence
exercised by superiors over subordinates is not relevant to the attainment of an equilibrium
where all individuals have the same attitude as the top manager.
Proof. See the Appendix.
To see the intuition behind this result, consider the extreme situation where the number
of individuals with positive and negative attitudes is the same in each level. Since in the
network everybody communicates with everybody, even in this extreme case the leader’s
influence always makes the difference. Therefore, the attitude of a supported top manager
prevails independently of the degree of influence exercised by superiors over subordinates.
4.2 Non-Supported Leader
The characterization of the optimal organization in the case of a non-supported leader
is more problematic. In this section, after deriving some results for the general case, we
concentrate on the particular case of an isolated leader.
4.2.1 General Case
In contrast with the supported leader case, here the network is not necessarily an optimal
structure, leading to an equilibrium where all individuals have a positive attitude. We first
identify conditions under which in equilibrium the network leads to an isolated leader.
Proposition 4.2 In the non-supported leader case, if the influence exercised by superiors
over subordinates is not suffi ciently large, the network leads, under both dynamics, to an
equilibrium where the leader is isolated.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
To understand the intuition for this result, we distinguish two types of cross-influence
effects. The leader cross-influence effect corresponds to the informal relationships including
the top manager. This encompasses all the direct diagonal relationships and override of
authority chain contacts involving the top manager. The member cross-influence effect
corresponds to the informal relationships excluding the top manager. This includes direct
peer contacts and all the direct diagonal relationships and override of authority chain
contacts excluding the top manager. The informal relationships including the top manager
facilitate the dissemination of his/her attitude. In contrast, since most individuals have
a negative attitude, in the network the informal relationships excluding the top manager
can only make attitude change more diffi cult. If the influence exercised by superiors over
subordinates is suffi ciently small, under the network the member cross-influence effect
dominates the leader cross-influence effect and, as a result, the system converges to the
isolated leader case.
We now establish suffi cient conditions for the hierarchy to be preferred to the network.
In particular, for a two-level organization, i.e. K = 2, the result is trivial. Under the
assumed initial conditions of a non-supported leader, the hierarchy will always lead to a
final configuration where all individuals attain a positive attitude, whereas the result in a
network depends on the relative value of u/d and on the number of individuals with positive
attitude in the second level. Hence, for K = 2 the network is the worst solution, always
dominated by the hierarchy. The following Proposition establishes a suffi cient condition
for the hierarchy to dominate the network as a function of the number of organizational
levels.
Proposition 4.3 In the non-supported leader case, a suffi cient condition for the hierarchy
to be preferred to the network is that the number of levels in the organization is large enough.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the hierarchy, there are typically clusters of individuals with a negative attitude that
do not interact with individuals having the opposite attitude. As we saw, this clustering
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effect makes attitude change more diffi cult. In the non-supported leader case, the cross-
influence effect associated with the network may reinforce this problem. This happens if
the combined impact of the negative informal influences each individual suffers dominates
the combined impact of the positive informal influences. The larger the number of organi-
zational levels, the stronger these negative informal influences under the network. Thus,
if the number of levels is suffi ciently large, the hierarchy dominates the network.
4.2.2 Isolated Leader
In the isolated leader case it is possible to establish suffi cient conditions under which the
hierarchy is optimal. For that purpose it is convenient to derive some intermediate results.
We first identify suffi cient conditions for the equilibrium configuration to coincide with the
initial configuration.
Lemma 4.1 In the isolated leader case, under both dynamics a suffi cient condition for
any organizational structure to lead to an equilibrium with the initial configuration is that
any agent in the second level has a suffi ciently large span of control.
Proof. See the Appendix.
If individuals in the second level have a suffi ciently large number of subordinates, their
combined influence dominates the influence exercised by the top manager. In this case,
under the hierarchy the initial configuration prevails in equilibrium because the leader
does not have suffi cient influence to trigger attitude change in the second level in the
organization. Furthermore, the cross-influence effects associated with the network or a
hybrid organization do not induce attitude change. The leader cross-influence effect does
not induce change because each individual below level two has a superior with a negative
attitude, whose influence cancels that of the top manager. The member cross-influence
effect leads to the mutual reinforcement of the initial negative attitude of the members
involved.
We are now in position to establish suffi cient conditions under which the hierarchy is
optimal, independently of the initial configuration of attitudes.
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Proposition 4.4 If all agents have a suffi ciently small span of control, then the hierar-
chy is at least as good as the network under both considered dynamics and for all initial
configurations, leading to an equilibrium where all individuals have a positive attitude.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition is straightforward. If the maximum number of subordinates of any mem-
ber is suffi ciently small, the adverse clustering effect associated with the hierarchy is not
an obstacle to the dissemination of the top manager’s attitude. In such cases, the cross-
influence effect associated with the network or a hybrid organization can only lead to the
mutual reinforcement of the members’initial attitudes, making change more diffi cult.
We may now state the following result concerning the optimal organizational structure
in the isolated leader case.
Proposition 4.5 In the isolated leader case, the hierarchy is an optimal structure under
both dynamics if all agents in the second level have the same number of subordinates and
if no other agent has as many subordinates.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Since all individuals, with the exception of the top manager, have an initial nega-
tive attitude, the member cross-influence effect makes attitude change more problematic.
To understand the role of the leader cross-influence effect, it is convenient to distinguish
two situations. If the level of influence exercised by superiors over subordinates is suffi -
ciently large, the adverse clustering effect is not a problem and, as a result, the leader
cross-influence effect, although strong, is unnecessary. If the influence of superiors over
subordinates is suffi ciently small, the leader cross-influence effect is too week to make a
difference. Thus, under the conditions specified in this proposition, the hierarchy is an
optimal structure.
It follows from Proposition 4.5 that, for the specified conditions, under the optimal
structure the dynamics is irrelevant.
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Corollary 4.3 In the isolated leader case, if all agents in the second level have the same
number of subordinates and if no other agent has as many subordinates under the hierarchy
the dynamics is irrelevant.
To understand the intuition for this result, consider the following. In the isolated leader
case, under the hierarchy, if no other agent has as many subordinates as those in level two,
a necessary condition for the top manager’s attitude to prevail is that, in the first time
individuals in level two revise their attitudes, they assume a positive attitude. In other
words, either the top manager is able to change the attitude of the individuals in level 2, or
it is not possible for the top manager’s attitude to prevail in the organization. Furthermore,
if the top manager is able to change the attitudes of all managers in level two and no other
agent has as many subordinates as those in level two, the attitude of individuals in lower
levels will also change, independently of the order by which individuals in different levels
revise their attitudes. As a result, the dynamics is irrelevant.
In general, the ability of the top manager to change the members’attitudes depends
on the level of influence exercised by superiors over subordinates. The following Corollary
establishes necessary and suffi cient conditions for the top manager’s attitude to prevail.
Corollary 4.4 In the isolated leader case, under any organizational structure, a necessary
condition for the leader to change the prevailing attitude in the organization is that the
number of subordinates of individuals in the second level is suffi ciently low; under the
hierarchy, this is a suffi cient condition. The larger the influence exercised by superiors
over subordinates, the larger the required span of control for which this result holds.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The necessary condition results from the fact that the leader has to convince at least
the second-level manager who has less subordinates (all with negative attitudes). The
suffi cient condition under the hierarchy corresponds to the situation where any positive-
attitude superior converts his/her direct subordinates, since the influence from above is
larger than the aggregate influence from below.
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The table below summarizes the main results above.
Organizational Structure Dynamics
Supported Leader Network Irrelevant
Non-Supported Leader Hierarchy* Irrelevant
* This result holds under the conditions specified in the proof of Proposition 4.3. In
particular, it holds if the number of levels is suffi ciently large.
4.3 Optimal Dynamics
Our results for the supported leader and isolated leader cases seem to indicate that the
dynamics is irrelevant. However, depending on the initial configuration of attitudes, this
may not hold. In this section, we identify conditions under which the dynamics is relevant
and irrelevant, both for the network and the hierarchy.
4.3.1 Relevance of the Dynamics: Network
In the first part of this section we identify suffi cient conditions for the dynamics to be
irrelevant under a network and use these conditions to explain the results in the former
sections.
The results about the relevance or irrelevance of the dynamics are crucially determined
by the comparison of the attitude of each individual with Hl (t) , a measure of the influence
exercised by all organizational members over a member in a level l of the organization under
a network. More specifically, we define the variableHl (t) = [hil (t)+esil (t)]/e, where hil (t)
is the field felt at time t by individual i in level l, and the term esil (t) is added to ensure
that the final variable does not depend on the considered individual i. We now show that
Hl (t) is the same for all individuals in a given level at each point in time.
Lemma 4.2 The measure of influence Hl (t) is the same for all individuals in a given level
at each point in time.
We are now in position to derive suffi cient conditions for the dynamics to be irrelevant.
Proof. See Appendix.
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Proposition 4.6 Under a network structure, a suffi cient condition for an equilibrium
where all individuals have a positive attitude to arise under any dynamics is that Hl (t) >
+1. In addition, a suffi cient condition for an equilibrium where all individuals have a
negative attitude to arise under any dynamics is that Hl (t) < −1.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition reflects the natural idea that whenever the influence exercised over all
organizational members is strong, i.e., either very positive or very negative, the dynamics
is not relevant as it does not influence the final configuration of attitudes. The Propo-
sition also helps us to understand the results presented in Corollary 4.1, Proposition 4.2
and Lemma 4.1 about the irrelevance of the dynamics. Any supported leader configura-
tion satisfies condition (4) in the Appendix, reflecting the first suffi cient condition in the
Proposition above. Also, any non-supported leader configuration satisfies condition (5) in
the Appendix, reflecting the second suffi cient condition. Thus, both in Corollary 4.1 and
Proposition 4.2 the dynamics is irrelevant. In particular, notice that Corollary 4.1 is a spe-
cial case of Proposition 4.6. Moreover, under quite general conditions, the isolated leader
configuration satisfies condition (5). This implies that also in Lemma 4.1 the dynamics is
irrelevant.
We now identify a suffi cient condition under which the dynamics is relevant.
Proposition 4.7 Under a network structure, if Hl ∈ ]−1, 1[ for all individuals in at least
one level l, then (i) the sequential dynamics is optimal if, in each level, the first individual
to revise his/her attitude has a negative attitude, and (ii) the simultaneous dynamics is
optimal if, in each level, the first individual to revise his/her attitude has a positive attitude.
Proof. See the Appendix.
In the network, any individual in level l such that the aggregate influence exercised over
him/her is relatively weak, i.e., Hl ∈ ]−1, 1[, changes his/her attitude during the process
of revision of attitude. Consider first the case where the initial attitude of individual i
in level l is negative, or sil (t) = −1. Since Hl (t) = [hil (t) + esil (t)]/e, it follows that
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hil (t) > 0 and individual i will revise his/her attitude to become positive. As a result, Hl
will become larger than +1 and the field felt by any other individual in that level will be
positive. In this case, the first individual to revise his/her attitude is a "positive trigger",
as he/she triggers the dissemination of a positive attitude. In a similar way, if the initial
attitude is positive, i.e., sil (t) = +1, then hil (t) < 0 and individual i will revise his/her
attitude to become negative. As a result, Hl will become smaller than −1 and the field
felt by any other individual in that level will be negative. In this case, the first individual
to revise his/her attitude is a "negative trigger", as he/she triggers the dissemination of
a negative attitude. Thus, if under a sequential dynamics the first individual to revise
his/her attitude is a positive trigger, the sequential dynamics dominates the simultaneous
dynamics, where all individuals revise their attitudes at the same time. In contrast, if
under a sequential dynamics the first individual to revise his/her attitude is a negative
trigger, the simultaneous dynamics dominates the sequential dynamics since under the
simultaneous dynamics some attitudes may become positive. These results reflect the idea
that the sequential dynamics is preferable if the top manager is able to induce individuals
at different levels of the organization to change their attitudes in the desired direction and
use them as change agents.
The following table summarizes our results for the dynamics under the network.
Weak Aggregate Influence Strong Aggregate Influence
Positive Trigger Sequential Irrelevant
Negative Trigger Simultaneous Irrelevant
4.3.2 Relevance of the Dynamics: Hierarchy
We now consider the case of the hierarchy. We start by characterizing suffi cient conditions
under which the dynamics is irrelevant.
Proposition 4.8 Under the hierarchy, if the maximum number of subordinates of any
agent is suffi ciently low, then the dynamics is irrelevant.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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This proposition proves that if the maximum span of control in the organization is
suffi ciently low the dynamics is irrelevant, because all final attitudes become positive in-
dependently of the dynamics.15 We now show that the dynamics may also be irrelevant
even if there are individuals in the organization with a larger span of control, provided
that some additional conditions are satisfied.
Proposition 4.9 Under the hierarchy, if the number of subordinates of any agent is large,
the dynamics is irrelevant provided that each individual has a suffi ciently large number of
subordinates with a negative attitude.
Proof. See the Appendix.
This proposition shows that, if some individuals in the organization have a large span
of control , a suffi ciently large number of subordinates with a negative attitude ensures
that all final attitudes become negative independently of the dynamics.
There are situations where the dynamics may not be indifferent, i.e., situations where
we cannot guarantee that the attitudes under the simultaneous and the sequential dynam-
ics will be the same. The next proposition identifies conditions under which the choice
of dynamics makes a difference. In particular, it specifies conditions under which, in-
dependently of the initial configuration of attitudes, under the sequential dynamics all
individuals end up with a positive attitude, while under the simultaneous dynamics this is
not necessarily the case.
Proposition 4.10 Under the hierarchy, if the number of subordinates of any agent is large,
the dynamics is relevant provided that each individual has a suffi ciently small number of
subordinates with a negative attitude.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Under the sequential dynamics, the positive attitude of the top manager guarantees
the dissemination of his/her attitude throughout the organization. In the first step of the
15Note that the suffi cient conditions in Lemma 4.1 and Proposition 4.4 coincide with the suffi cient
condition in this proposition. This explains why those results do not depend on the dynamics.
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dynamics the top manager induces a positive attitude on all his/her direct subordinates,
since the number of subordinates with a negative attitude is limited. In the second step each
of those subordinates induces a positive attitude on all of his/her own subordinates, and so
on. Under the simultaneous dynamics, although the second level of the organization will
convert entirely to the positive attitude (as in the sequential dynamics), not all elements
in the third level will necessarily be contaminated by that positive attitude. The reason is
that the first step of the simultaneous dynamics may increase significantly the number of
fourth-level agents with negative attitudes.
The following table summarizes our results for the dynamics under the hierarchy.
Large Span of Control Low Span of Control
Large relative no neg. subordinates Irrelevant Irrelevant
Low relative no neg. subordinates Relevant Dynamics Irrelevant
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we use a formal model to analyze the dynamic process of attitude trans-
mission and change in organizations. As suggested by Harrison and Carroll (1991: 554),
there are important managerial reasons to study the processes of influence in organizations,
since managers have some degree of control over their main determinants (see also Schein,
1985; O’Reilly, 1989). In particular, we focus on the problem faced by top management
of choosing the organizational structure and the timing of information flows that favour
the dissemination of the desired attitudes throughout the organization. We identify three
underlying factors that determine the optimal organizational structure and the extent to
which the alignment of attitudes is achieved: (1) clustering effects, i.e., the existence, in
the formal structure, of clusters of individuals with a given attitude that only communicate
with members with the same attitude; (2) member cross-influence effects, that result from
direct peer contact and from all the direct diagonal relationships and override of authority
chain contacts excluding the top manager; and (3) leader cross-influence effects, that result
from all the direct diagonal relationships and override of authority chain contacts including
the top manager. For each initial configuration of attitudes, the interplay of these factors
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determines the optimal organizational structure.
More specifically, we show that in the supported leader case, the network is an optimal
structure where consensus is attained. While in the hierarchy clustering effects typically
make attitude change more diffi cult, the leader and member cross-influence effects associ-
ated with the network help overcome this problem, because at least half of the members
in each level have a positive attitude. This result is consistent with the idea that the
socialization process can be managed to intensify the dissemination of a given corporate
culture throughout the organization (e.g., Schein, 1985; O’Reilly, 1989; Harrisson and Car-
roll, 1991). In contrast, in the non-supported leader case, we identify conditions under
which the hierarchy dominates the network. In this case, since the number of individuals
with a negative attitude is at least the same as the number of individuals with a positive
attitude, the cross-influence effects associated with the network may reinforce the problems
due to the clustering effect. This happens if the member cross-influence effect dominates
the leader cross-influence effect. Furthermore, in the specific case of an isolated leader, we
identify conditions under which the hierarchy is optimal, leading to the desired consen-
sus. When all individuals, with the exception of the top manager, have an initial negative
attitude, the member cross-influence effect makes attitude change more problematic. To
understand the role of the leader cross-influence effect, it is convenient to distinguish two
situations. If the influence exercised by the top manager, when interacting with subordi-
nates, is suffi ciently large, the adverse clustering effect is not a problem and, as a result,
the leader cross-influence effect, although strong, is unnecessary. If the influence exercised
by the top manager is suffi ciently small, the leader cross-influence effect is irrelevant.
Carroll and Burton (2001) find that structures that are highly connected (analogous
to what is here defined as networks) may perform much worse than those with a lower
level of connection (analogous to what is here defined as hierarchies) when undertaking
complex task assignments. While Carroll and Burton focus on the impact of complexity
in the choice of the optimal organizational structure, we study how the dynamic process
of attitude dissemination affects this choice. Interestingly, in our model the hierarchy does
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not necessarily dominate the network. As mentioned above, the higher level of socializa-
tion associated with the network may facilitate the dissemination of the desired attitude
throughout the organization. A similar result is obtained by Mungovan et al. (2011) using
a different dynamic model of norm evolution in social networks. These authors also find
that increasing the frequency of interactions results in higher levels of convergence.
We also analyze the relationship between the timing of information flows and attitude
change in organizations. We identify two types of situations where the choice of dynamics
is irrelevant. First, this may happen because, for the initial configuration of attitudes
and organizational structure considered, the system converges to the desired equilibrium,
independently of the dynamics. The dynamics may also be irrelevant because the two
dynamics lead to the same final equilibrium where the leader is isolated. In addition, we
specify conditions under which the choice of dynamics makes a difference. By influenc-
ing the degree of participation and the order by which individuals revise their attitudes,
the top manager may influence the equilibrium configuration of attitudes. In particular,
we show that, depending on the order by which individuals in a given level revise their
attitudes, the sequential dynamics may dominate, or be dominated, by the simultaneous
dynamics. This means that the choice of dynamics is a non-trivial problem deserving
careful attention. Our results may have interesting implications for the network theory
of social influence developed by Friedkin and Johnsen (e.g., Friedkin, 1986, 1991, 1998;
Friedkin and Johnsen 1990, 1997). In spite of acknowledging the possibility that influences
are exercised sequentially, these authors focus on the simultaneous dynamics. Although
our model and the one proposed by Friedkin and Johnsen are different, our results about
the relevance of the dynamics seem to suggest that further work is required to analyze
the implications of different dynamics, also in the context of their network theory of social
influence.
This paper complements the extensive literature that uses computational contagion
models to analyze the dissemination of relevant determinants of decisions in arbitrar-
ily large networks (Carley, 1991; Harrison and Carroll, 1991, 2002; Carroll and Burton,
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2001;Valente, 2005; Hirshman et al., 2011; and Mungovan et al., 2011). There are two
main differences between our paper and this literature. First, we explicitly model the
formal links of authority that characterize an organization. This allows us to study how
organizational structure and the timing of information flows affect the dynamics of the
attitude change. In our model, individuals do not have equally strong ties to all other
individuals. In contrast, the influence exercised by one organizational member on another
one depends on their relative hierarchical position. Second, in the vein of the network
theory of social influence developed by Friedkin and Johnsen (e.g., Friedkin, 1986, 1991,
1998; Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990, 1997), we derive our conclusions in a mathematically
closed-form way, without having to rely on simulation methods. Our methodology not
only avoids the validity issues often raised about the use of computational models in or-
ganization science (Burton and Obel, 1995), but also allows us to identify - through the
analysis of the mechanisms of the proofs of the different results - the underlying factors
that determine the optimal organizational structure.
The model considered in this paper may be extended in several ways. One possibility
is to consider a model where, in addition to the top manager, some other members do
not change their initial attitude during the dynamic process, regardless of the influences
exercised over them. In fact, in many change processes in real life, some organizational
members have such strong convictions that it does not seem reasonable to expect their
attitudes to change by the influence of other members. In our model this would correspond
to a situation where some individuals have strong personal values and beliefs or, in other
words, a large value for α. The relevant questions are under what conditions it is beneficial
to have some members with ‘strong personalities’and where they should be ‘located’(near
the top, spread around the organization, etc.).
Another possible extension is to consider some negative influences in the organization.
In this paper, we assume that all the influences are positive, meaning that when two indi-
viduals with equal attitudes interact, their attitudes are reinforced. If negative influences
are considered, then the opposite effect is produced: when two individuals with equal at-
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titudes interact, their attitudes tend to disalign. This negative influence may arise in real
organizations from the existence of competition, distrust, animosity or sense of separate
identity between pairs of individuals. In our model this situation corresponds to making
some parameters Jij negative.
This paper may also be extended by assuming that attitude change is not deterministic.
In our model, we assume that the change of j-th attitude occurs according to the rule
given in equation (1) with certainty. Alternatively, one may consider that influences create
nothing more than a predisposition for attitude maintenance or change, so that attitudes
may or may not evolve according to the rule given by equation (1). Non-deterministic
behavior is caused by noise originated, for example, by misunderstandings. This situation
may be modeled by assigning a probability p > 1/2 to the attitude given by the rule in
equation (1) and 1 − p to the opposite attitude. It may also be interesting to study the
situation where, ex-ante, each individual in the organization (except the top manager) has
an equal probability of having either a negative or a positive attitude. This would force
a discussion of the optimality of the various structures and dynamics when the precise
“location”of attitudes is not known ex-ante.
An additional extension would be to consider that individuals influence each other
strategically. When there are executives and managers with authority to make discre-
tionary decisions, affected employees may try to influence their decisions. Several authors
have studied the ways in which careful organizational choices can, at least partially, control
the direct costs of influence activities (e.g., Holmström and Ricart i Costa, 1986; Milgrom,
1988). A related question is how the attempt to influence the organization’s decisions
affects the dynamic process of social influence and attitude change. Building on the social
exchange model proposed by Coleman (1972, 1973), Marsden (1981) proposes a model
where individuals may influence each other strategically, in the pursuit of their individual
goals. However, his model does not incorporate a dynamic process of influence. In fact,
he assumes that individuals influence each other only once, and does not study how the
repeated interplay of the influence process leads to an equilibrium configuration of inter-
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ests. For simplicity, we ignore this kind of strategic behavior, assuming that any chosen
organizational structure determines the matrix J . Notice, however, that much observed
behavior in organizations is not truly strategic. Attitudes often change simply because
individuals understand and are influenced by how others really evaluate a given object.
In this perspective, this paper studies how this kind of influence depends on the system
of communication channels and on the timing of information flows that characterize an
organization.
6 Appendix
In this appendix, we present the proofs of our results.
Proof of Proposition 4.1
In the network, the i-th individual of level l is under a field
hil = u
∑
k<l
(n+k − n−k ) + e(n+l − n−l − sil) + d
∑
k>l
(n+k − n−k )
= (u− esil) + u
∑
1<k<l
(n+k − n−k ) + e(n+l − n−l ) + d
∑
k>l
(n+k − n−k ), (2)
where n+k and n
−
k denote the number of individuals at level k starting with a positive and
negative attitude, respectively. Since u > e, the assumption that n+i > n
−
i for all i ensures
that hil > 0 for all i and l. Thus, no matter what dynamics is used, the number of positive
attitudes increases until all individuals assume a positive attitude.
Proof of Corollary 4.1
Follows from the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Proof of Corollary 4.2
Follows from the proof of Proposition 4.1.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
For K > 2, from expression (2) , it follows that hil < 0 under the assumed conditions,
since n+k − n−k < 0 for all k > 1. For l = 2, the field reads hni2 = (u− esi2) + e(n+2 − n−2 ) +
d
∑K
k>2(n
+
k −n−k ) and, if u < (K−2)d, the result follows no matter what dynamics is used.
Proof of Proposition 4.3
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Under the hierarchy
hhil(t) = usp,l−1(t) + d
ηil+qil∑
k=ηil+1
sk,l+1(t) (3)
with ηil =
∑i−1
k=1 qkl and p denoting the superior of i. Notice that, by construction, for
l > 2, we have hhil(t) > −u− dqil. For l = 2, we have hhi2(t) > u− dqi2. Under the network,
we have from expression (2)
hnil = u
∑
k<l
(n+k − n−k ) + e(n+l − n−l − sil) + d
∑
k>l
(n+k − n−k ).
For l > 2, we have
∑
k<l(n
+
k − n−k ) ≤ 3 − l, (n+l − n−l − sil) ≤ 0 and
∑
k>l(n
+
k − n−k ) ≤
− (K − l) . Hence hnil ≤ −d(K − 3)− (u− d) (l − 3) . For l = 2, the field reads
hni2 = (u− esi2) + e(n+2 − n−2 ) + d
K∑
k>2
(n+k − n−k ) ≤ u− d (K − 2) .
A suffi cient condition for hhil(t) ≥ hnil is that
qi2 ≤ K − 2,
and for l > 2,
qil ≤ −
u
d
+ (K − 3).
If both conditions above are satisfied, the hierarchy is preferred to the network. From the
result above, we know that a suffi cient condition is that qil ≤ max[K − 2,−ud + (K − 3)].
Since K − 2 > −u
d
+ (K − 3) > K − 4, it follows that the hierarchy is preferred to the
network if K > q∗ + 4, where q∗ denotes the maximum number of subordinates of any
agent in the organization.
Proof of Lemma 4.1
In the network, we know from equation (2) that
hnil = (u− esil) + u
∑
1<k<l
(n+k − n−k ) + e(n+l − n−l ) + d
∑
i>l
(n+k − n−k ).
Since in this case n+k = 0 and n
−
k = n and sil = −1 for all i > 1, we have
hnil = (u+ e)− u
∑
1<k<l
nk − enl − d
∑
k>l
nk = u
(
1−
∑
1<k<l
nk
)
+ e (1− nl)− d
∑
k>l
nk.
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Since 1−
∑
1<k<l nk < 0 for l > 2 and nl ≥ 1, we have hil < 0 for all l > 2. For l = 2,
hni2 = u+ e (1− n2)− d
∑
k>2
nk.
Let qml = mini qil denote the minimum number of subordinates of any agent in level l.
Since
∑
k>2 nk ≥ qm2 and n2 > 1, we have hni2 < 0, leading to our result. In the hierarchy,
equation (3) and u ≤ qm2 d imply negative fields for all individuals. A hybrid organization
can be seen as a hierarchy plus some informal links. For the case of an arbitrary individual
in the second level, the initial field under the hierarchy is hhi2(0) = u−dqi2. Under a hybrid
structure it is hhybi2 (0) = u−dqi2−dni2, where ni2 ≥ 0 denotes the number of informal links
associated with that particular individual. Thus, for u ≤ qm2 d, no individual in the second
level changes attitude. Similarly, no individual in lower levels will change attitude, since
hhybil (0) = −u− dqil − dndil − eneil − unuil + uδil,
where ndil ≥ 0 denotes the number of informal links with individuals in lower levels, neil ≥ 0
denotes the number of informal links with individuals in the same level, nuil ≥ 0 denotes
the number of informal links with individuals in higher levels (except the top manager),
and δil is equal to 1 if there is a direct link to the top manager and zero otherwise. This
concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.4
Define q∗ = maxl q∗l as the maximum number of subordinates of any individual in the
organization. Under the hierarchy, the field felt by any individual is given by equation (3).
Notice that, by construction,
ηil+qil∑
k=ηil+1
sk,l+1(t) ≥ −qil ≥ −q∗ ⇒ hil(t) ≥ usp,l−1(t)− q∗d.
Since s11 = +1, u > q∗d implies hi2(t) > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n2 and for all t ≥ 0. Consider
first the sequential dynamics starting at t = 0. For t ≥ n2, we have si2(t) = +1,∀i, leading
to hi3(t) > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n3. In general, if t ≥
∑ν
k=2 nk, we have sik(t) = +1,∀i,
for all k ≤ ν. Hence, at t = N the system attains the fixed point configuration where
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all individuals have positive attitudes. In the simultaneous dynamics, all individuals in
l = 2 become positive at t = 1. For the same reason, in the next step of the dynamics
all individuals in l = 3 become positive. The process goes on until all individuals become
positive at t = K.
Proof of Proposition 4.5
If u > q∗d, from Proposition 4.4 the hierarchy is optimal under both considered dynam-
ics, leading to an equilibrium where all individuals have a positive attitude. If u ≤ qm2 d, we
know from Lemma 4.1 that, under both dynamics, the equilibrium configuration will be
the one where the leader is isolated, independently of the organizational structure. Since
by assumption qm2 = q
∗, this concludes the proof of our statement for all values of u.
Proof of Corollary 4.4
Follows from Lemma 4.1 and from Proposition 4.4.
Proof of Lemma 4.2
Under the network, the field felt by individual i in level l is given by
hil (t) = u
∑
k<l
[
n+k (t)− n−k (t)
]
+ e
[
n+l (t)− n−l (t)− sil (t)
]
+d
∑
k>l
[
n+k (t)− n−k (t)
]
.
Let ∆k (t) = n+k (t)− n−k (t) and note that
hil (t) > 0⇔ sil <
u
e
∑
k<l
∆k (t) + ∆l (t) +
d
e
∑
k>l
∆k (t)
hil (t) < 0⇔ sil >
u
e
∑
k<l
∆k (t) + ∆l (t) +
d
e
∑
k>l
∆k (t) .
For simplicity, we introduce the following notation
∆ (t) =
∑
k
∆k (t) ; ∆̂l (t) =
∑
k<l
∆k (t) ; ∆̌l (t) =
∑
k>l
∆k (t) .
Furthermore, assume α ≡ u/e and, for simplicity, γ ≡ d/e ≥ 1. Under this specification,
the two conditions above simplify to
hil (t) ≥ 0⇔ sil (t) ≤ Hl (t)
hil (t) ≤ 0⇔ sil (t) ≥ Hl (t) ,
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where
Hl (t) = (α− 1) ∆̂l (t) + (γ − 1) ∆̌l (t) + ∆ (t) ,
and by construction does not depend on i.
Proof of Proposition 4.6
The suffi cient conditions in this Proposition are
Hl (t) ≥ +1,∀l > 1 (4)
for the first part and
Hl (t) ≤ −1,∀l > 1 (5)
for the second part. Since sil (t) ∈ {−1,+1} , we have that if Hl (t) ≥ +1 for a given
level l, then hil ≥ 0 for all individuals in that level. Similarly, if Hl (t) ≤ −1 for a given
level l, then hil ≤ 0 for all individuals in that level. Under condition (4) it follows that
hil ≥ 0,∀l, and any dynamics implies ∆ (t+ 1) ≥ ∆ (t) , leading to an equilibrium where
all individuals have a positive attitude. From condition (5) it follows that hil ≤ 0,∀l,
and any dynamics implies ∆ (t+ 1) ≤ ∆ (t) , leading to an equilibrium where the leader is
isolated.
Proof of Proposition 4.7
Consider an arbitrary level l. Under the simultaneous dynamics, we have the following
three possibilities
Hl ≥ +1⇒ n+l (t+ 1) = n+l (t) + n−l (t) ≡ nl
Hl ∈ ]−1, 1[⇒ n+l (t+ 1) = n−l (t)
Hl ≤ −1⇒ n+l (t+ 1) = 0
Under the sequential dynamics, starting with an individual with a positive attitude, we
get for nl ≥ τ > 0
Hl ≥ +1⇒ n+l (t+ τ) = n+l (t) + max
{
τ − n+l (t) , 0
}
→ nl
Hl ∈ ]−1, 1[⇒ n+l (t+ τ) = max
{
0, n+l (t+ τ − 1)− 1
}
→ 0
Hl ≤ −1⇒ n+l (t+ τ) = max
{
0, n+l (t+ τ − 1)− 1
}
→ 0.
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Under the sequential dynamics, starting with an individual with a negative attitude, we
get for nl ≥ τ > 0
Hl ≥ +1⇒ n+l (t+ τ) = n+l (t) + max
{
τ − n+l (t) , 0
}
→ nl
Hl ∈ ]−1, 1[⇒ n+l (t+ τ) = min
{
nl, n
+
l (t+ τ − 1) + 1
}
→ nl
Hl ≤ −1⇒ n+l (t+ τ) = max
{
0, n+l (t+ τ − 1)− 1
}
→ 0.
Therefore, due to the levels where Hl ∈ ]−1, 1[ ,the sequential dynamics starting with an
individual with a negative attitude is preferred to the simultaneous dynamics, which, in
turn, is preferred to the sequential dynamics starting with an individual with a positive
attitude.
Proof of Proposition 4.8
It is convenient to start by characterizing what happens with the attitude of an arbitrary
individual under both dynamics.
The field felt by individual i in level l, given by equation (3), can be rewritten as
hil(t) = usp,l−1(t) + d
i,l∑
sk,l+1(t),
where
∑i,l denotes the sum over all subordinates of individual i at level l, and p denotes
his/her superior. Let qil denote the total number of direct subordinates, n+il (t) denote the
number of subordinates with a positive attitude at time t, and n−il (t) denote the number
of subordinates with a negative attitude. Then,
n+il (t) + n
−
il (t) = qil
and the field above can be rewritten as
hil(t) = usp,l−1(t) + d[n
+
il (t)− n−il (t)].
Also, let q∗ denote the maximum number of subordinates that any agent has in the orga-
nization, i.e.,
q∗ = max
l
q∗l = max
l
{max
i
qil}.
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We first characterize what happens with an arbitrary individual in a hierarchy under
the sequential dynamics. Since there are no same-level peer interactions in a hierarchy, we
assume, without loss of generality, a dynamics that revises the attitudes of all individuals
in each level at the same time. Assume that individual i in level l revises his/her attitude
at t+ 1. Then,
sseqil (t+ 2) = sign
[
usp,l−1(t) + d
i,l∑
sk,l+1(t)
]
= sign
{
usp,l−1(t) + d[n
+
il (t)− n−il (t)]
}
. (6)
Consider now the simultaneous dynamics. For an arbitrary individual i in an arbitrary
level l, we have in the second step of the dynamics
ssimil (t+2) = sign
[
uspl−1(t+ 1) + d
i,l∑
skl+1(t+ 1)
]
= sign
[
u sign hpl−1(t) + d
i,l∑
sign hkl+1(t)
]
(7)
The result of the proposition follows from the comparison of these two equations.
Consider an individual i in level l, whose superior has a positive attitude and does not
change it, i.e., sp,l−1(t) = sp,l−1(t + 1) = +1. Under the assumption that qil ≤ q∗ < u/d,
it follows from equations (6) and (7) that si,l(t + 2) = +1 under both dynamics. Each
of its subordinates will then have a superior with a positive attitude in the next step of
the dynamics and the argument applies again until all agents under the initial superior
attains a positive attitude. Since the head of the organization (the individual in l = 1)
has a positive attitude at time t = 0 that does not change by design, the argument may
apply initially to each of the individuals in level l = 2 and then for all other levels. Since
the argument does not depend on the dynamics, the result follows.
In the case where q∗ = u/d, the above argument follows obviously for every individual
i in level l such that qil < q∗. Let us focus on the first individual such that qil = q∗ = u/d.
Knowing that his/her superior has attained a positive attitude at some point under either
dynamics, we consider three cases.
• If at least one of his subordinates has a positive attitude. It follows that n+il (t) >
0 ⇒ hil(t) > 0 and the above argument still holds for both dynamics, leading to
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sil(t + 1) = +1. This clearly implies that sil(t + 2) = +1 under both dynamics,
since the worst that may happen is that in the simultaneous dynamics all his/her
subordinates have changed into negative attitudes at t+1, leading to a null resulting
field and ssimil (t + 2) = s
seq
il (t + 2) = +1. However, we are left to show that if
n+il = 0, his/her final attitude does not depend on the dynamics. This leads to the
two following cases.
• If the focal individual has a positive attitude si,l(t) = +1 and all his/her subordinates
have a negative attitude, then n+il (t) = 0⇒ hil(t) = 0⇒ sil(t+ 1) = +1 under both
dynamics, by the argument just described.
• If the focal individual has a negative attitude si,l(t) = −1 and all his/her subordinates
have a negative attitude, then for the sequential dynamics n+il (t) = 0⇒ s
seq
il (t+ 2) =
−1. Notice that in the sequential dynamics all the subordinates of the focal individual
will remain with negative attitudes in subsequent times since they have at most q∗
subordinates themselves (by definition of q∗) and even if all these have a positive
attitude, the fact that u = q∗d constrains change. This same argument applies in
the case of the simultaneous dynamics. Here, either signhkl+1(t) = sk,l+1(t+ 1) = −1
for all the subordinates of the focal individual and ssimil (t+ 2) = s
seq
il (t+ 2) from (7)
and (6), or hkl+1(t) = 0 for some subordinate, leaving its attitude sk,l+1(t+ 1) = −1
negative and sustaining ssimil (t+ 2) = s
seq
il (t+ 2).
This concludes our proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.9
We show that under the hierarchy if the number of subordinates of any agent is larger
than u/d and the maximum span q∗ is strictly larger than u/d, a suffi cient condition for
the dynamics to be irrelevant is that, for all agents, the number of subordinates with a
negative attitude is larger than half of the sum of u/d with the number of subordinates,
i.e., n−il >
1
2
(qi,l + u/d) for all i, l. The condition qil ≥ u/d ensures that 12 (qi,l + u/d) ≤ qi,l.
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Under the condition n−il >
1
2
(qi,l + u/d) we then have
hil = usp,l−1(t) + d[n
+
il (t)− n−il (t)]
= usp,l−1(t) + d[qil(t)− 2n−il (t)]
< usp,l−1(t)− u ≤ 0.
From equation (6), we have that under the sequential dynamics
sseqil (t+ 2) = −1.
Under the simultaneous dynamics, the argument above holds for l > 2 leading to
spl−1(t+ 1) = sign hpl−1(t) = −1
and
skl+1(t+ 1) = sign hkl+1(t) = −1.
From equation (7) we conclude that for l ≥ 2
ssimil (t+ 2) = −1
thus concluding our proof.
Proof of Proposition 4.10
We show that under the hierarchy if the number of subordinates of any agent is larger
than u/d and the maximum span q∗ is strictly larger than u/d, a suffi cient condition for
the dynamics to be relevant is that, for all agents, the number of subordinates with a
negative attitude is less than half of the sum of u/d with the number of subordinates, i.e.,
n−il <
1
2
(qi,l + u/d) for all i, l. Under the condition n−il <
1
2
(qi,l + u/d) we then have
hil = usp,l−1(t) + d[n
+
il (t)− n−il (t)]
= usp,l−1(t) + d[qil(t)− 2n−il (t)]
> usp,l−1(t)− u ≤ 0.
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If the superior of a given agent i in level l has a positive attitude, the agent’s field will be
positive. From equation (6), we have that under the sequential dynamics
sseqil (t+ 2) = +1.
Since the top manager has a positive attitude, we conclude that the above conditions ensure
the diffusion of that positive attitude, under the sequential dynamics, throughout the
whole organization. Under the simultaneous dynamics, individuals whose initial attitude
are positive and whose superiors do not have initially a positive attitude, will feel a field
hil > −2u that may be negative, changing in that case their attitudes into negative, and
increasing the number of negative subordinates (and superiors) in the system, possibly
invalidating the condition n−il <
1
2
(qi,l + u/d). In the second step of the dynamics a
subordinate of one such individual will feel a field that may be negative for the very
same reason, increasing the number of negative subordinates in the system. This shows
that, under the conditions of this proposition, the sequential dynamics is preferred, thus
concluding our proof.
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